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Abstract
This paper discusses financial fraud detection in imbalanced dataset
using homogeneous and non-homogeneous Poisson processes. The
probability of predicting fraud on the financial transaction is derived.
Applying our methodology to the financial dataset shows a better pre-
dicting power than a baseline approach, especially in the case of higher
imbalanced data.
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1 Introduction
Financial fraud is growing exponentially, especially because of the large sums
involved. McAfee estimates in 2018 that cybercrime, of which financial fraud
is a factor, costs the world about US$ 600 billion, or 0.8% of global GDP.
According to McKinsey, global losses due to card fraud could reach nearly
US$ 44 billion by 2025. In addition to the direct cost of fraud, companies
also suffer from lost sales when real transactions are denied by the com-
panies. McKinsey estimates that false positives account for up to 25% of
transactions denied by online retailers, see Dyzma (2018). However, as a
first step, banks and financial institutions have approached the detection of
fraud using manual procedures or rule-based solutions, which have yielded
good results, but these methods currently have limitations. The rule-based
approach means that a complex set of requirements for suspicious transaction
reporting must be defined and reviewed manually. While this may be effec-
tive in detecting anomalies consistent with known patterns, it does not detect
frauds that follow new or unknown patterns. The increasing complexity of
digital attacks and the creativity of cyber-attackers make these conventional
detection methods less effective and quickly obsolete. More sophisticated
techniques must be developed, including automatic learning algorithms, and
evolve the detection of fraud towards methods using adaptive rules to tighten
the mesh of the network.
The machine learning models work with many parameters and are much more
efficient at finding subtle correlations in the data, which can be masked by
an expert system or by human criticism, Dyzma (2018). The large volume
of transactional data and client data readily available in the financial ser-
vices industry makes it an ideal tool for the application of complex machine
learning algorithms. In addition to learning from known models, machine
learning can go further and learn new models without human operation.
This allows models to adapt over time to discover previously unknown pat-
terns or to identify new tactics that can be used by fraudsters. In fact, the
development of conventional machine learning algorithms has led them to
solve some specific problems, one of the most important features of which
is that the distribution of data is generally balanced, unlike financial fraud,
which is not balanced. Most standard classifiers such as decision trees and
neural networks assume that learning samples are evenly distributed among
different classes. However, in many real-world applications, the ratio of the
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minority class is very small( 1:100, 1:1000 or can be exceeded at 1:10000).
Due to the lack of data, few samples of the minority learning class tend to be
falsely detected by the classifiers and the decision limit is therefore far from
correct. Numerous research works in machine learning has been proposed
to solve the problem of data imbalance; He and Garcia (2009), Galar et al.
(2012), Krawczyk (2016), Elrahman and Abraham (2013), etc. However,
most of these algorithms suffer from certain limitations in real-world appli-
cations, such as the loss of usual information, classification cost, excessive
time, and adjustments, see Elrahman and Abraham (2013).
In this paper, we address the problem of fraud detection in imbalanced data
using the Poisson process; fraud is defined as a rare event occurring at a ran-
dom time and involving significant financial losses. In this context, the fraud
times are defined as the jump times of the Poisson process with intensity that
describes the instantaneous rate of fraud. Unlike machine learning methods,
we do not look inside the subtle correlations in the data; instead, we assume
that an exogenous rate or intensity must be determined. Instead of asking
why the fraud is committed, the fraud rate is calibrated using market data.
A lot of research has been done on the application of the Poisson process to
financial risks, see Artzner and Delbaen (1995), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995),
Duffie and Singleton (1999), etc. For calibration purposes, we assume that
intensity is a deterministic function of time that takes into account the homo-
geneous and inhomogeneous Poisson process. Three main inputs are needed
to estimate the intensity: the deterministic form of the intensity function,
the arrival times of the frauds and the labels.
The main contributions of the paper are:
1. Even though the intensity based approach is used in many fields, such
as credit risk models, we are among the first to apply this approach to
fraud detection
2. The Poisson process is addressed to rare events and it requires few
inputs for the estimation of the intensity; so, the risk of over-fitting
and computational cost would be reduced.
3. The approach combined with the machine learning algorithms can con-
duct to a sophisticated technique for detecting frauds.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the mathemat-
ical concepts of Poisson process; the homogeneous and the Inhomogeneous
Poisson process are reviewed. The estimation of the intensity and the pre-
diction of fraud events are discussed. In the section III, the model is applied
to financial datasets and the results are presented. The dataset was provided
by NetGuardians 4, a swiss company which develops solutions for banks to
proactively prevent fraud.
2 Mathematical concepts of Poisson Process
2.1 Fraud Event
Consider a financial institution such as a bank, an insurance company, a
trading company, etc. and information about its clients. We are interested
in the occurrence of fraud in client transactions for such an institution. The
fraud event is then defined as a rare event occurring at a random time and
resulting in significant financial losses for the client and the financial insti-
tution. Whatever the definition used for a fraudulent event, let us note the
fraud time by τ which corresponds to [0,∞] value of random variable on the
filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P). Ω denotes the possible states of the
world, F is the σ-algebra, F = (Ft)t≥0 is the filtration with Ft contains all
information up to time t and FT = F . P is the probability measure de-
scribing the likelihood of certain events. The only mathematical structure
assumed for τ is that it should be a stopping time, that is a random variable
τ : Ω → R+ ∪ {∞}, such that {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for t ≥ 0. Intuitively, one can
determine whether or not the fraud time occurs before a certain deterministic
time by observing the past up to time t, which is encoded in the filtration
(Ft).
Now consider a sequence (τn)n≥0 of fraud times and let N = {N(t); t ≥ 0}
be a counting process given by
N(t) =
∑
n>0
1{τn6t} (1)
In other words, N(t) counts the number of fraud events between 0 and t. N
has the following properties: 1.N(t) ≥ 0; 2.N(t) is an integer; 3. For s ≤ t,
4https://netguardians.ch
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N(s) ≤ N(t). The last property implies that N is a submartingale since
E (N(t)|Fs) ≥ N(s). Because of the last property, the Doob-Meyer theorem
guarantees the existence of an increasing predictable process A called com-
pensator starting at 0 such thatM = N−A is a martingale. The compensator
A is uniquely defined up and governs the distribution of N . We assume that
the compensator A is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure such
that there is a non-negative, integrable and predictable intensity process λ
that satisfies
A(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds (2)
The process λ represents the conditionally expected number of events per
unit of time in the sense that, at any time t, the Ft− conditional probability
of an event between t and t + h is approximatively λ(t)h for small h, where
Ft− contains all information just before time t. In fact, because N has the
predictable intensity process λ, dN(t)−λ(t)h is a martingale increment, and
heuristically we thus have
E (dN(t)− λ(t)h|Ft−) = 0 (3)
Since λ is predictable, λ(t) ∈ Ft− so we can move λ(t)h outside the expecta-
tion and obtain
E (dN(t)|Ft−) = λ(t)h (4)
and
E (N(t+ h)−N(t)|Ft−) = λ(t)h (5)
For more details see Reiss (1993) and Fleming and Harrington (2005)
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the counting process with a deter-
ministic intensity that gives rise to homogeneous and inhomogeneous Poisson
process. In this context, the likelihood of fraud events will be derived and
implemented.
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2.2 Homogeneous Poisson Process
2.2.1 Overview
The Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) is a fundamental stochastic pro-
cess which is simple, easy to understand and possesses desirable mathemat-
ical and theoretical properties making it easy to handle. It can be easily
extended to more complicated and realistic situations Kingman (1993). Let
N = (N(t))t≥0 be the counting process defined above i.e. for each t > 0
which counts the number of fraud events that happen between time 0 and
time t. In order to have an overview of the Poisson process, let’s consider
three definitions of the Poisson process that are equivalent to each other. For
the proof see Ross (2010) and Drazek (2013).
Definition 2.1. N is an HPP with constant intensity λ ≥ 0 if:
1. N(0) = 0;
2. The process has stationary and independent increments;
3. For small h, P (N(t+ h)−N(t) = 1) = λh+ o(h)
4. P (N(t+ h)−N(t) ≥ 2) = o(h)
Definition 2.2. N is an HPP with constant intensity λ ≥ 0 if:
1. N(0) = 0;
2. The process has stationary and independent increments;
3. For 0 ≤ s < t,N(t) − N(s) is Poisson distributed with parameter
λ(t− s).
That is,
P (N(t)−N(s) = k) = e
−λ(t−s)(λ(t− s))k
k!
(6)
For any interval for size t, λt is the expected number of frauds in that interval.
Definition 2.3. N is HPP with constant intensity λ ≥ 0 if the waiting times
between successive events, or arrivals follow an exponential distribution of
parameter λ.
This definition made the Poisson process unique among renewal process by
the memoryless of the Exponential distribution.
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2.2.2 Estimation of the intensity λ
The simple and trivial way for estimating the constant intensity λ is to use
the above third definition of the HPP related to the Exponential distribution
of the waiting times.
Let N = (N(t))t≥0 an homogeneous Poisson process of parameter λ and
(τn)n≥0 a sequence of fraud times. We define Sn = τn − τn−1, the waiting
times between the event n− 1 and the event n with S1 = τ1. Because (St)t≥0
follows the exponential distribution of parameter λ,
E(Sn) =
1
λ
(7)
Using the moment method, the estimator λ of λ is given by
λ =
1
S
(8)
which is also the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) of λ
2.3 Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process
2.3.1 Overview
Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) means that the intensity λ(t) is
deterministic function. Thus, the distribution of the number of events be-
tween two particular points on the timeline is no longer a function depending
on the difference between these points, as in the case of a Homogeneous Pois-
son Process (HPP). Here it is a function of the starting-point and the en point
of the time interval and is not necessarily stationary. Let’s start with the
definition of the NHPP given in Ross (2010)
Definition 2.4. The counting process N = (N(t))t≥0 is said to be a NHPP
with intensity function λ(t), t ≥ 0, if it satisfies,
1. N(0) = 0;
2. N has independent increments;
3. for small h, P (N(t+ h)−N(t) = 1) = λ(t)h+ o(h)
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4. P (N(t+ h)−N(t) ≥ 2) = o(h)
The function λ(t) is sometimes called the instantaneous arrival rate of the
NHPP.
A consequence of the above definition is that N(t) − N(s) follows Poisson
distribution of parameter
∫ t
s
λ(u)du. That is,
P (N(t)−N(s) = k) = e
− ∫ ts λ(u)du(∫ t
s
λ(u)du)k
k!
(9)
We can explore the relationship between the average number of events oc-
curring up to the time t and the intensity function λ(t) of the corresponding
NHPP:
E(N(t)) =
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds = A(t) (10)
As described above, the compensatorA(t) is a non-decreasing right-continuous
function and is referred here as the expectation function of the NHPP.
In addition, the expected number of events between times t and t + s is
expressed as
E(N(t+ s)−N(t)) =
∫ t+s
t
λ(u)du = A(t+ s)− A(t) (11)
According to Cox and Lewis (1966), we can examine the distribution function
of the time to the next event in NHPP by
P (1 or more events occurred in (t, t+ s]) = 1− e−
∫ t+s
t λ(u)du = 1− e−(A(t+s)−A(t))(12)
Let ts = t+ s, the probability density function of the time to the next event,
which can be obtained by deriving the expression in (12) with respect to ts
d
ts
P (1 or more events occurred in (t, ts]) = λ(ts)e
−(A(ts)−A(t)) (13)
As we will see later, this expression (13) is very useful in estimating of the
intensity.
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2.3.2 Estimation of the intensity λ(t)
Suppose we have data from a non-homogeneous Poisson processN = (N(t))t≥0
and we are looking for the intensity function that caused it. The first step is
to define the form of the intensity λ(t); we limit ourselves to the case of para-
metric intensity. In the second step, given the probability density function
defined in (13) we can use the principle of Maximum Likelihood Estimate
(MLE) to find the intensity parameter λ maximizing the likelihood that a
fraud will occur. The procedure is the following:
Suppose the n events occur at τ1 < τ2 < ... < τn in the interval (0, T ]. Since
the n events are independent and using (13), the desired joint probability
density takes the form
λ(τ1)e
−(A(τ1)−A(0)) · λ(τ2)e−(A(τ2)−A(τ1)) · ... · λ(τn)e−(A(τn)−A(τn−1))
·P (N(T )−N(τn) = 0)
where
P (N(T ) − N(τn) = 0) is the probability of no event occurs in the interval
(τn, T ]. It is calculated as follows
P (N(T )−N(τn) = 0) = e−(A(T )−A(τn))
The likelihood of getting τ = τ1, τ2, ..., τn is then
L(λ; τ = τ1, τ2, ..., τn) = e
−A(T )
n∏
i=1
λ(τi)
The Log-Likelihood is :
l(λ; τ = τ1, τ2, ..., τn) = −A(T ) +
n∑
i=1
log(λ(τi)) (14)
= −
∫ T
0
λ(s)ds+
n∑
i=1
log(λ(τi)) (15)
The intensity estimate consists in finding the parameters of the intensity
λ(t) maximizing the Log-likelihood function defined in (15). This estimated
intensity is then used to predict the fraud event on the next transaction
(T + 1) based on the information available up to the time of the transaction
T .
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2.4 Prediction of Fraud Event
Consider the filtration FT that contains the information about the fraud
events up to time T . Suppose a new transaction is in progress at time Tδ
(Tδ > T ) and we would like to know if this transaction is fraudulent or not.
Proposition 1. The probability that a fraud occurs at time Tδ is given by
P (a fraud occurs at Tδ) = 1− e−(A(Tδ)−A(T )) (16)
where
A(T ) =
∫ T
0
λ(s)ds
Proof. Following (12)
P (a fraud occurs atTδ) = 1− P (a fraud does not occur atTδ)
= 1− P (N(Tδ)−N(T ) = 0|FT )
= 1− e−
∫ Tδ
T λ(u)du
= 1− e−(A(Tδ)−A(T ))
In the special case of homogeneous Poisson process, that is for constant λ
P (a fraud occurs atTδ) = 1− e−λ(Tδ−T ) (17)
We observe that in the case of homogeneous Poisson process, the probability
of fraud is a function of parameter λ and the elapsed time (Tδ − T ) between
the two transactions. For the Inhomogeneous Poisson, it is actually a func-
tion of the difference between the compensator A(Tδ) and A(T ).
Following (16): as (Tδ − T )→∞, (A(Tδ)− A(T ))→∞ and then the
P (the fraud occurs atTδ)→ 1. On another side, as (Tδ − T )→ 0, (A(Tδ)−
A(T ))→ 0 and then the P (the fraud occurs atTδ)→ 0.
Therefore, when the time between two transactions is large, it is very likely
that the model generates a fraud alert. On the other hand, when two trans-
actions are close, the model will not generate a fraud alert. This consequence
could reduce the predictive power of the model when there is a succession of
fraud events in record time.
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3 Application to Financial Dataset
3.1 Choice of deterministic intensity functions
To apply the Poisson process to the dataset, the shape of the intensity func-
tion must be defined. Three classes of intensity functions are proposed. For
each class of function λ(t), we set the conditions for λ(t) ≥ 0.
1. λ(t) = λ: this is the case of Homogeneous Poisson process and λ must
be greater than 0. λ is estimated following § 2.2.2.
2. λ(t) = a+ bt: the intensity is assumed to be a linear function of time.
To ensure λ(t) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we impose the conditions{
a ≥ 0
b+
a
T
≥ 0 (18)
Proof. We want λ(t) = a+ bt ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
If t = 0:
λ(t) = a, λ(t) ≥ 0⇒ a ≥ 0
If 0 < t ≤ T :
a+ bt ≥ 0⇔ b ≥ −a
t
We also know that −a
t
≤ − a
T
since a ≥ 0. In order to have b ≥ −a
t
,
it is sufficient that b ≥ − a
T
⇔ b+ a
T
≥ 0. So, the conditions are a ≥ 0
and b+
a
T
≥ 0.
If T →∞, we obtain the trivial condition
{
a ≥ 0
b ≥ 0
Therefore, when we consider a short period to estimate the intensity
parameters, the feasible region of (18) expands to find the optimal
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solution. The figure 1 shows the feasible regions for different values of
T . For sake of readability, a 6 10 and b 6 100. We observe that when
T becomes larger, the feasible region is reduced to the trivial region.
3. λ(t) = a + bt + ct2: the intensity is a quadratic function as a function
of time. To ensure λ(t) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we impose the conditions

a ≥ 0
c ≥ 0
b+
a
T
≥ 0
(19)
The proof is similar to the above. Also, when when T → ∞, (19) is
reduced to 
a ≥ 0
b ≥ 0
c ≥ 0
The conditions (18) and (19) are the constraints of the optimization problem
in (15) for the Inhomogeneous Poisson process.
11
(i)
(ii)
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(iii)
Figure 1: (i) Example of feasible region for λ(t) = a+ bt ≥ 0 when T = 0.02:
solution is in (18). The region is shown for a 6 10 and b 6 100. (ii) as for
(i) but T = 0.2. (iii) as for (i) but T = 20.
3.2 Data
The datasets provided by NetGuardians consist of two years of transactions
for clients of a financial institution. It covers the period from 09-2015 to 09-
2017 and includes a total of 18, 139, 078 transactions made by 124, 177 clients.
For confidentiality reasons, the name of the financial institution will not be
mentioned. The dataset includes a total of 49 features such as transaction
dates, transactions amounts, transaction senders IDs, transaction recipients
account numbers, banking countries, etc.. To be able to train a Poisson pro-
cess algorithm, labelled data with examples of fraud are needed. All trans-
actions in the dataset are labeled as fraudulent or not. Since the ground
truth is not available, the labeling is based on the following simple pattern:
transactions for which banks receiving money are outside Switzerland are
considered fraudulent. With the labelling method only 55, 226 clients have
fraudulent transactions. To train the Poisson process, three features are
required: client ID, timestamp and the label. Timestamps and labels are
trained for each client to estimate the intensity of the fraud that will be used
to predict fraudulent event.
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The proportion of fraud corresponding to the number of fraudulent transac-
tions in relation to the total number of transactions is calculated for each
client. According to the labeling method, some clients may have a 100%
fraud proportion. This concerns clients for whom the recipient institutions
are all located outside Switzerland. To be realistic, we remove these clients
from our analysis. In addition, clients that do not contain any fraud events
in the complete dataset are deleted because the hours of fraud events are un-
known and their intensity can not be estimated. In addition, these datasets
contain only one class and, in this context, no measure of classification per-
formance such as ROC-AUC is defined.
The figure 2 shows the distribution and the Boxplot of fraud proportions. We
notice that the cleaned dataset is generally unbalanced because most clients
have a low proportion of frauds. The Boxplot shows a skewed right data
with the presence of larger outliers. With the value of the median, 50% of
the clients have a fraud proportion less than 9%.
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(i)
(ii)
Figure 2: (i) Histogram of Fraud proportions in the full dataset. (ii) Boxplot
of Fraud proportions in the full dataset. The clients with no fraud events and
the clients with 100% of fraud proportion are removed from this full dataset
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However, it is important to mention that the labelling method is relatively
simple and that the above histogram is not representative of the true distri-
bution of fraud because, in practice, the majority of fraud proportions are
less than 1%. To study our analysis in an imbalanced dataset framework, we
propose to focus on the clients with less than 20% frauds. Next, we divide
this dataset into four subsets containing different fraud profiles. The first
subset includes clients fraud rate less than 1%, the second subset concerns
clients with a proportion between 1% and 5%, the third subset is for clients
whose fraud proportion is between 5% and 10% and the last one for clients
whose fraud proportion is between 10% and 20%. Figure 3 shows the Boxplot
for each group. The four datasets are roughly symmetric with no outliers.
Obviously, the greater variability in the group 4 and the smaller variability
in the group 1 are well observed.
Figure 3: Boxplots for the four subsets. Clients with the fraud proportion
P ≤ 20% are grouped in four subsets containing different fraud profiles.
In each subset, we randomly select 500 clients and we train and test the Pois-
son models on the transactions for each client. The training set represents
the first 80% of transactions for which intensity parameters are estimated.
The test set represents the last 20% and the fraud events are predicted with
the estimated parameters. In addition, to take into account the time-varying
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intensity parameters, the prediction in the test set is also performed by rolling
windows.
From a practical point of view, when there is no fraud in the training set, it
is difficult to estimate the fraud intensity because the fraud event times are
not available; see equations (8) and (15). Two solutions are possible:
1. Remove the clients for whom there was no fraud occurrence in the
training set; The consequence is that we could lose more information.
2. Make the assumption that the intensity i.e. the occurrence rate of fraud
λ = 0 as there is no fraud events in the training set. In this context
the fraud prediction probability is zero; see Proposition 1.
We conduct our analysis with the last one that is the intensity λ = 0 when
we train a dataset with no fraud information. The main reason is that we
expect to keep most of client profiles in our analysis. As we will see later,
under this assumption the dynamic models perform worse than the static
models. To compare the various Poisson models, we define a baseline model
(benchmark) based on a naive approach. The naive approach is to calculate
the proportion of fraud in the training set and use that probability to predict
fraud in the test set. Finally, predictive performance is summarized in each
subset using two performance measures: ROC-AUC and Average Precision
(AP) Score.
3.3 Results
By adding the rolling windows approach to our study, we have a total of 6
models to compare. Let start by giving more explanations to the 6 models:
1. The first model is the homogeneous Poisson process (λ(t) = λ). The
constant intensity λ is estimated in the training set. By (17), the
estimated λ is used for predicting the fraud event in the whole test set.
We note this model by HomoStatic.
2. The second model is the Homogeneous Poisson process unless the pre-
diction is done by rolling windows. The window starts by the training
set and it is used for the estimation of the intensity; this estimated
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intensity is used to predict the fraud event on the next transaction in
the test set. Then, the sliding window is shifted one step ahead on the
next transaction. The intensity is estimated again in the second time
window and it is used for the prediction of fraud on the next transac-
tion. This procedure is repeated until the end of the test set. The goal
of this methodology is to take account the time varying of the intensity.
The model is denoted by HomoDynamic.
3. The third model is the non-homogeneous Poisson process with the in-
tensity is a linear function of time (λ(t) = a+ bt). Intensity paramters
are estimated in the training set and are used for the fraud prediction
in the whole test set. It is denoted LinearStatic.
4. The fourth model is the inhomogeneous linear intensity function unless
the prediction is performed by rolling windows. The rolling windows
procedure is the same as above. It is denoted LinearDynamic
5. The fifth model is the non-homogeneous Poisson process with the in-
tensity being a quadratic function of time (λ(t) = a + bt + ct2). The
procedure is the same as in LinearStatic. We denote this model
QuadraticStatic
6. The last model is as QuadraticStatic unless we make a prediction by
rolling windows. It is denoted by QuadraticDynamic
In addition, we note by NaiveStatic the baseline model to estimate the
probability of fraud in the training set and using the same probability for
the prediction in the test set. The probabilities of prediction are therefore the
same for all the transactions of the test set. This is equivalent to a random
classifier because the model has no discrimination capability to distinguish
genuine transactions from fraudulent transaction.
We are interested in the power of prediction of the different models. Thus,
all the results presented below are based on the predicting probabilities and
the labels in the test set. The tables 1 to 4 show the AUC (Area Under
The curve)-ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curves for the differ-
ent models in each group. AUC-ROC is the measure of performance for the
classification problem at various thresholds settings. ROC is a probability
curve and AUC represents the degree or measure of separability. It tells how
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much the model is able to distinguish between classes. Higher the AUC,
better the model is. By analogy, higher the AUC, better the model is at dis-
tinguishing between genuine and fraudulent transactions. The tables show
the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and maximum for the AUCs
calculated for 500 clients in each group.
We note that dynamic models (with rolling windows) are more volatile than
static models (without rolling windows). All static models perform signifi-
cantly better than the dynamic models. The LinearStatic model is the best
one and has a mean AUC of 69%, 73%, 72%, 71% in the group 1, group
2, group 3 and group 4 respectively. It is followed by the QuadraticStatic
model. The baseline model (naive approach) is significantly worse than Pois-
son models with the exception of the QuadraticDynamic model in the group
1 where the mean AUC is 47%. However, the HomoDynamic model performs
better than the other dynamic models. It is important to mention that in
some cases Poisson do not predict frauds correctly, as AUCs are equal to 0.
It is often the case when the fraud information used in the training set to
estimate the intensity is not sufficient for the prediction in the test set. Let
us illustrate one common situation in our dataset where there is no fraud in
the training set that conducts to AUC=0. Consider an example of dataset
with 6 training instances and 3 test instances. The labels are:
Training set: [0 0 0 0 0 0] Test set: [1 0 0]
The labels 0 indicate genuine transactions and labels 1 indicate fraudulent
transactions. There is no fraud events in the training set and from the above
assumption λ = 0. For all static models, the prediction probabilities in the
test set are 0 and therefore the AUC-ROC is equal to 0.5. On the other hand,
the dynamic models based on the sliding windows show an AUC-ROC equal
to 0. In fact, it is easy to show that using the sliding windows in the test set,
the first predicting probability is 0 and the next two ones are different to 0.
This conducts to an AUC-ROC equal 0.
AUC-ROC can be a misleading measure for classification in imbalanced fraud
dataset. One of the main reason is that it underestimates the false positive
rate. In fact, since the number of legitimate transactions (negative examples)
far exceeds the number of fraudulent transactions (positive examples), a sig-
nificant variation in the number of false positives can lead to a slight change
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Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.503217 0 0.341836
HomoStatic 1 0.674555 0.434599 0.227029
LinearDynamic 1 0.499829 0 0.339872
LinearStatic 1 0.684265 0.434599 0.235382
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.471564 0 0.313377
QuadraticStatic 1 0.676788 0.434599 0.231372
NaiveStatic 0.5 0.50 0.50 0
Table 1: AUC: Summary for statistics in the group 1 (P ≤ 1%)
Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.658384 0 0.297473
HomoStatic 1 0.716914 0.048193 0.246125
LinearDynamic 1 0.639246 0 0.295391
LinearStatic 1 0.732957 0.048193 0.246664
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.612797 0 0.287221
QuadraticStatic 1 0.727479 0.048193 0.243740
NaiveStatic 0.5 0.50 0.50 0
Table 2: AUC: Summary for statistics in the group 2 (1% < P ≤ 5%)
Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.682609 0 0.273724
HomoStatic 1 0.709963 0 0.251212
LinearDynamic 1 0.670611 0 0.268545
LinearStatic 1 0.717206 0 0.244682
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.649789 0 0.262771
QuadraticStatic 1 0.714477 0 0.243915
NaiveStatic 0.5 0.50 0.50 0
Table 3: AUC: Summary for statistics in the group 3 (5% < P ≤ 10%)
in the false positive rate. This can lead to erroneous conclusions. In this
case the precision-recall analysis is more appropriate because these metrics
do not take into account the number of legitimate transactions (negative ex-
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Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.675263 0 0.254579
HomoStatic 1 0.695023 0 0.246416
LinearDynamic 1 0.655216 0 0.262901
LinearStatic 1 0.709309 0 0.241264
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.650595 0 0.261025
QuadraticStatic 1 0.708917 0 0.240598
NaiveStatic 0.5 0.50 0.50 0
Table 4: AUC: Summary for statistics in the group 4 (10% < P ≤ 20%)
amples) in their calculation. We focus on the Average Precision (AP) which
is an estimate of the area under the precision-recall curve and their results
are shown in the following tables 5 to 8. All the Poisson models significantly
outperform the naive approach and static approaches perform better than
the dynamic approaches. LinearStatic model still remains the better one for
all groups, following by the QuadraticStatic model. Also, the HomoDynamic
model performs better than the other dynamic models. In conclusion, the
AUC-ROC and AP analyses showed that in all four groups the linearStatic
model is the best; it is followed by the QuadraticStatic model and then by
the HomoDynamic model. All the Poisson models outperform significantly
the baseline approach.
We are also interested in the relative performance in term of prediction be-
tween the Poisson models and the baseline approach. The idea is to deter-
mine in which group the Poisson models perform best. AP scores are used for
this analysis. The relative variations between the Mean Average-Precision
(MAP) for the different Poisson models and the baseline model are calculated
in the table 9. The table shows that the relative variation decreases when
the fraud proportion of the group increases. So, the predicting power of the
Poisson models increases with the degree of imbalanced dataset. Figure 4
shows the relative performance for the different models in each group. We
observe that the relative performance is better in the group 1 and that the
linearStatic model outperforms the other 5 models.
During the analysis, we observe that dynamic approaches (Rolling Windows)
are less efficient than the static approaches regardless the performance mea-
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sures. That is, taking account the temporal variation of the intensity pa-
rameters by the rolling windows does not produce better results. Two mains
reasons could explain this weak performance of dynamic models. First, as
illustrated above, the assumption of λ = 0 when we train a dataset with no
fraud may conduct to this weak performance. Second, the window size is
essential for the the forecast accuracy. In fact following Inoue et al. (2017),
different window sizes may lead to different empirical results in practice and
good results might be obtained simply by chance. To produce better results,
one can vary the window size and select the optimal window size for better
prediction. Another possibility is to consider a stochastic intensity model
that incorporates the time varying of the parameters. This has to be con-
ducted in a next research.
Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.274416 0.004132 0.400234
HomoStatic 1 0.332728 0.004132 0.430593
LinearDynamic 1 0.202763 0.004132 0.325295
LinearStatic 1 0.390334 0.004132 0.456534
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.135732 0.004132 0.263333
QuadraticStatic 1 0.354866 0.004132 0.439122
NaiveStatic 0.05 0.022027 0.001511 0.011081
Table 5: AP: Summary for statistics in the group 1 (P ≤ 1%)
Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.451901 0.005307 0.354692
HomoStatic 1 0.511768 0.005307 0.369290
LinearDynamic 1 0.380657 0.005216 0.331117
LinearStatic 1 0.566920 0.005358 0.361079
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.279384 0.005320 0.266282
QuadraticStatic 1 0.548226 0.005358 0.362918
NaiveStatic 0.25 0.062533 0.007576 0.047267
Table 6: AP: Summary for statistics in the group 2 (1% < P ≤ 5%)
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Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.540694 0.029412 0.318448
HomoStatic 1 0.578589 0.029412 0.312256
LinearDynamic 1 0.497483 0.029412 0.302288
LinearStatic 1 0.598028 0.029412 0.303077
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.440209 0.029412 0.288972
QuadraticStatic 1 0.589859 0.029412 0.299586
NaiveStatic 0.5 0.141468 0.010638 0.113300
Table 7: AP: Summary for statistics in the group 3 (5% < P ≤ 10%)
Models Max Mean Min Standard Deviation
HomoDynamic 1 0.560771 0.040000 0.286504
HomoStatic 1 0.599116 0.040000 0.283211
LinearDynamic 1 0.540127 0.040000 0.286291
LinearStatic 1 0.623278 0.040000 0.271896
QuadraticDynamic 1 0.517028 0.040000 0.286320
QuadraticStatic 1 0.622054 0.040000 0.270560
NaiveStatic 0.8 0.203014 0.018519 0.123488
Table 8: AP: Summary for statistics in the group 4 (10% < P ≤ 20%)
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Models P ≤ 1% 1% < P ≤ 5% 5% < P ≤ 10% 10% < P ≤ 20%
HomoDynamic 11.458411 6.226555 2.822037 1.762236
HomoStatic 14.105765 7.183912 3.089905 1.951114
LinearDynamic 8.205382 5.087254 2.516586 1.660544
LinearStatic 16.721054 8.065881 3.227313 2.070128
QuadraticDynamic 5.162206 3.467756 2.111730 1.546766
QuadraticStatic 15.110806 7.766931 3.169568 2.064102
Table 9: Relative Variations of MAP between the Poisson Models and the
Baseline model in the four groups
Figure 4: Relative performances between the different models and the base-
line approach. These performances are plotted in each group showing in
which group the Poisson models perform the best
4 Conclusion
The Poisson process is applied to detect fraud in an imbalanced dataset. The
case of homogeneous and non-homogeneous Poisson processes is investigated.
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For non-homogeneous Poisson process, the linear and quadratic functions are
considered. We have shown how to estimate the intensity and to predict fraud
events. Our methodology is applied to financial datasets.
For each Poisson model studied, we consider the static and the dynamic ap-
proach. Unlike the static approach, the dynamic one takes into account the
temporal variation of intensity parameters and works with rolling windows.
All models are compared to a baseline model of fraud prediction using the
proportion of frauds obtained in the training set. We found that all Poisson
models outperform the baseline and that static approaches perform better
than the dynamic ones. The static linear model remains the better for all
groups followed by the static quadratic model and then by the homogeneous
Poisson model. The study also showed a better predicting power of the Pois-
son models in the case of more imbalanced dataset.
One of the main problems of this study is the training of the Poisson process
in a set with no fraud events. In this context, it is difficult to estimate the
intensity parameters because we have no fraud event times. In this study, it
is assumed that the intensity is zero. But as indicated above this assumption
could conduct to a poorer performance of the model.
Another problem is the dynamic of the intensity function. It is assumed here
that the fraud rate is constant or deterministic i.e. function of time. In fact,
fraud is a rare event that can happen at any times; so it must be stochastic,
a random variable at any time. These issues will be addressed in future
research by detecting fraud using a stochastic intensity model combined with
deep learning algorithms.
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